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In this note I will present a subtle interplay between density matrices and the knowledge about
their preparation, and I will argue that there is a need to consider a new type of quantum state, in
between pure states and density matrices.
Quantum mechanics presents many crucial differences
from the classical world that we know in our daily life.
One of the most dramatic of them is, arguably, the one
related to density matrices: In quantum mechanics it is
possible to have completely different physical situations
which nevertheless cannot be distinguished from one an-
other by any observation. This is the case of various
ensembles of systems prepared in ways corresponding to
the same density matrix. When information is also given
about how these different situations were prepared, we
can tell them apart, but as long as we only have the sys-
tems themselves, no observation can differentiate them.
In this short note I will present a new and subtle inter-
play between density matrices and knowledge about their
preparation.
Suppose Alice prepares a large ensemble of spin 1/2 par-
ticles by taking each particle separately, tossing an unbi-
assed coin, and then preparing the particle either “up”
or “down” along the z-axis. The particles are numbered,
and Alice notes their preparation in a notebook; she
therefore knows the state (“up-z” or “down-z”) for each
particle.
This ensemble of particles corresponds to the identity
density matrix.
Suppose now Alice were to give this ensemble to Bob,
without telling him anything about the preparation. As
it is well-known, Bob has absolutely no way to distinguish
this ensemble from any other ensemble that corresponds
to the same density matrix (identity density matrix in
this case), such as an ensemble of particles prepared by
taking each particle separately, tossing an unbiased coin,
and then preparing the particle either “up” or “down”
along the x axis. All he can do is to is to certify that
the ensemble corresponds to the identity density ma-
trix, but he can learn nothing about which particular
ensemble corresponding to that density matrix was pre-
pared. The “x-ensemble” is physically different from the
“z-ensemble” yet Bob has no way to distinguish them.
Alice however, knowing what she did, can do much more
than what Bob can: she can predict what results she will
get if she were to measure again the particles along the
z-axis. So, in particular, she could check if her ensemble
was substituted by another ensemble corresponding to
the identity density matrix.
All of the above is well known.
Suppose now that Alice loses her notebook. She still re-
members that she prepared the particles polarised along
the z axis, but not in which direction, “up-z” or “down-
z” each particle is. Apparently now she is in no better
position than Bob. Indeed, exactly like Bob, she can no
longer predict the outcomes of the measurements along
any axis, including the z-axis. Moreover, exactly like
Bob, she no longer has any way to determine whether or
not her ensemble was substituted by another ensemble
corresponding to the identity density matrix.
As she no longer can distinguish the ensemble she created
from any other ensemble corresponding to the same den-
sity matrix, we could be tempted to conclude that now,
for all practical purposes, all she has is a density matrix,
not a specific ensemble, exactly as Bob.
Yet, Alice still has some information about the original
ensemble, namely that it is a “z-ensemble”, i.e. that each
particle is polarised either “up-z” or “down-z”. That
represents a certain knowledge about the physical made-
up of the system, and it is more than what Bob knows.
But it seems that makes no difference.
Surprisingly however, as I will show now, there is a dif-
ference.
Consider the following scenario. After Alice prepared
the ensemble, as described above, she put it in a secure
place where nobody, including her, had access to it for
a given time period; the particles are well isolated and
remain undisturbed during this entire time. Meanwhile
she “loses” her notebook. Actually the notebook is not
lost but stolen by Charles. Charles then goes to a judge
and claims that he is the one that prepared the ensemble,
and that Alice had nothing to do with it. Hence the
ensemble, when released from its secure place, should be
given to him.
Charles feels certain to win since, using the stolen note-
book, he could prove to the judge that he knows what
2the ensemble is by correctly predicting the outcomes of
z-spin measurements. He also knows that Alice has no
way that she could prove to the judge that she knows
what the ensemble is, since she cannot predict correctly
the outcomes of any spin measurements on this ensem-
ble. Alice, however, can disprove Charles’ claim that she
has no knowledge whatsoever what the ensemble is:
Hearing Charles’ claim that she doesn’t know what the
ensemble is, Alice asks the judge not to reveal to her any-
thing about what ensemble Charles claims to have pre-
pared. She then tells the judge that this is a z-ensemble.
Then she asks the judge to request Charles to disclose
what the ensemble is, and to prove it by predicting the
results of the spin measurements. The judge should then
perform the measurements and check Charles’ predic-
tions. Of course, Charles has no option but to reveal
that this is a z-ensemble, since if he would say anything
else, he could not predict the result of the measurements.
Now, the probability that Alice, just by chance, indicated
the correct spin polarisation is vanishingly small, so, by
the above procedure, she clearly proves she knows what
the ensemble is.
An even more sophisticated scenario is also possible.
Suppose Charles convinces the judge that the polarisa-
tion direction he prepared is an important commercial
secret, and cannot be disclosed. Alice can still win. She
asks for the spins to be measured along a direction of her
choosing, and agrees to lose if Charles is able to predict
the results with probability only slightly better than 1/2.
The judge agrees to this procedure since (a) Alice can
only succeed if she is able to choose a direction perpen-
dicular to the direction of polarisation; if she doesn’t
know the polarisation, she has vanishingly small prob-
ability of doing this, and (b) if Alice doesn’t know the
direction and chooses a direction at random, Charles can
win without disclosing too much about the actual polar-
isation direction (even if he can predict the results with
greater probability, he only needs to do it slightly better
than 1/2, which gives him plenty of room to disguise the
actual polarisation direction).
Obviously, since Alice knows that the spins were prepared
polarised “up” or “down” along the z-axis, she requires
Charles to measure along, say, the x-axis, where he can-
not guess the results better than random and she wins.
To conclude, Alices knowledge is meaningful: from her
point of view the ensemble is more than the density ma-
trix to which it corresponds, although, by herself, she
cannot make any predictions better that Bob, who has
no knowledge at all, and for whom the state is just a
density matrix. This shows the existence of a new type
of physical “state”, which sits somewhere in between the
pure state that describes the situation for Charles, who
has full knowledge of the preparation, and the density
matrix that describes the situation for Bob who has no
knowledge at all. It is a new mathematical object that,
I believe, has to be introduced in quantum mechanics.
The above examples are, of course, very artificial and
with no immediate application; they are however most
probably just the tip of an iceberg, and I feel they have
deep implications on our understanding of what quantum
states are, what is physical about them, and what role
our knowledge plays.
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